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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. 20040522-CA 
v. 
RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES THE PLAIN MEANING OF 
UTAH STATUTES AND MISREADS THIS COURT'S CLEAR 
STATEMENTS THAT A DEFENDANT'S NON-VERBAL 
"REPRESENTATION" OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
MEETS THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
According to defendant, "[a] hand in a pocket even when pointed in the direction 
of a complainant, in the absence of a verbal representation" is not aggravated robbery, 
which requires "a tangible representation that the item in [the robber's] control is capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury." Aple. Br. at 9. This reading of Utah law 
results from omitting or misconstruing clear statutory language and equally clear 
guidance from this Court. 
2 
Under Utah law, a person commits simple robbery if he or she "unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose 
or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property; . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004). By contrast, a person commits aggravated robbery 
if in course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (emphasis added). "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or 
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Thus, to be charged with aggravated robbery, a defendant must either use or 
threaten to use a "dangerous weapon," which is "any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury [] or & facsimile or representation of the item." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-60l(5)(a) & (b) (emphasis added). According to Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 2382 (1993), "threaten" means "to give signs of the approach of (something 
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evil or unpleasant): indicate as impending: portend." For any store clerk or teller facing 
a would-be robber demanding money while gesturing or pointing with a hand in his 
pocket, the "approaching evil" is the possibility of being shot with a "dangerous weapon." 
A "facsimile," according to Webster's, is "an exact and detailed copy of something." Id. 
at 813.' For example, a toy gun or a replica of a gun would be a facsimile. There is no 
allegation that defendant used a facsimile; rather, he is accused of using a 
"representation" of a dangerous weapon. When defendant placed his hand in his pocket 
and pointed toward the store clerks or cashiers, he intentionally represented that he had a 
dangerous weapon, to wit: a handgun. He did so non-verbally by "portrayal or 
delineation... in a visible image or form." See Webster's at 1926. Finally, defendant's 
"use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to reasonably believe the item 
[was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
601(5)(b)(I). Something is "apparent" if it is "capable of easy perception[;] readily 
perceptible to the senses, esp sight[;] . . . Readily manifest to the senses or mind as real or 
true and supported by credible evidence . . ." Webster's at 102. Again, a robber who 
demands money while keeping one hand in his pocket conveys a meaning that is "readily 
perceptible": "I have a gun and I'm prepared to use it." 
1
 "In the case of unambiguous statutes, this court has a long history of relying on 
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, % 11, 992 
P.2d 986 (Utah 1996). 
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Defendant attempts to construe the statute as requiring a verbal representation of 
a "dangerous weapon." This argument runs aground in at least three ways. First, 
defendant studiously avoids discussion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(ii), which 
states that the actor commits aggravated robbery if he "represents to the victim verbally or 
in any other manner that he is in control o f a "dangerous weapon." (Emphasis added). 
This language, which defendant mentions only in passing in his brief, see, e.g., Aple. Br. 
at 11, 13, completely undercuts defendant's claim that the representation of a dangerous 
weapon must be verbal. Under the clear statutory language, the representation may be 
made "verbally or in any other manner'' Extending a finger or some other object in 
one's pocket in such a way that it looks like a gun represents a "dangerous weapon." 
Doing so in the course of a robbery gives rise to the reasonable belief by the victim that 
the robber is prepared to use the dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -601 (5)(b)(i). 
Moreover, statements such as "put the money in the bag," see Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript, R. 173:11, 14, accompanied by pointing or some other gesture calling 
attention to the weapon, communicates to the victim—in some manner other than a verbal 
representation—that the robber has a gun. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(ii). 
Second, even if the analysis were confined to section 76-6-60 l(5)(b)(i), 
defendant's argument still fails. Defendant states that "a hand in the pocket does not 
amount to a representation that the item is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury." Aple. Br. at 14. This statement would be true only if it were reasonably apparent 
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to the victim that the "item" in the robber's pocket was, in fact, a hand. But this is beside 
the point because it will rarely if ever be reasonably clear that the "representation" in the 
robber's coat or pants is only a hand. Because pockets generally are not transparent, the 
item concealed may appear to be "a Tootsie Roll, a finger or a gun." R. 173:19. 
Third, defendant's proposed interpretation would have disastrous consequences. 
Defendant apparently believes the victim should be required to eliminate all other 
possibilities in order to be reasonably sure the robber actually has a gun. This is 
unreasonable and dangerous. A reasonable store clerk or cashier must be allowed to 
assume that an item represented to be a gun in the course of a robbery is in fact a gun. 
Requiring a greater level of certainty would create a very real risk that the victim who 
guesses incorrectly will be shot when the item in the assailant's pocket turns out to be a 
real gun. See, e.g., Aaron v. Kelly, 65 F. Supp.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In Aaron, the 
defendant petitioned the federal court for writ of habeas corpus after he was convicted 
under a New York statute that enhanced the crime of robbery if the robber "[displays 
what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. . ." Id. 
at 185 (citing N.Y.Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b)). The defendant was convicted of robbing 
two students in a dorm house. While fleeing, defendant his hand in his pocket and, in a 
Such an assumption might not be reasonable under other circumstances. It would be 
unreasonable, for example, to assume that any customer who has his hands in his pockets has 
a gun. But when a robber makes threatening statements and points a pocketed hand toward 
the store clerk, she is entitled to assume he has a weapon. 
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"threatening manner," told the student chasing him to be quiet. Id. at 184. The defendant 
claimed that his gesture alone was insufficient to warrant a weapons enhancement under 
the statute. The federal court rejected that argument, noting that New York caselaw had 
long held that that "'display of anything that appears to be [a firearm], though held inside 
a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered5 by the law," thus elevating the level of offense 
for displaying what appears to be a firearm. Id. at 187. The court also stated that even if 
the student who pursued the defendant 
was in fact uncertain as to whether [defendant] had a gun or a knife, that 
would not affect the propriety of his conviction under New York law. "A 
robbery victim is not, in our view, required to call a robber's bluff, in order 
to allay any lingering uncertainty, before the armed offense is made out." 
Id. at 187 (citing People v. Bynum, 125 A.D.2d 207, 209, 509 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1st 
Dep't 1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4 (1987)). 
Defendant's selective use of pertinent authority also extends to this Court's case 
law. For example, defendant asserts that State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 
App. 1995), ainterpret[s] the term representation in the dangerous weapon statute to 
include a verbal representation that one has a firearm." Aple. Br. at 11. This statement of 
the Candelario holding is correct, but incomplete. It omits the illuminating and highly 
pertinent portion of the opinion interpreting the term "representation" within the statute to 
include non-verbal representation. The Court states that "representation" 
is an expansive term, and, while it can mean "a likeness, 
picture, model, or other reproduction," it can also refer to "a 
statement or account especially] made to convey. . .[an] 
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impression of something with the intention of influencing . . . 
action." 
Candelario, 909 R.2d at 278 (citing Webster's Third New Int 'IDictionary 813, 1926 
(1986)) (emphasis added). Moreover, "such a statement can be either in the form of a 
verbal assertion or nonverbal action" Id .at n.2 (emphasis added). The import of this 
language could not be clearer: Under Utah law, nonverbal action, such as the use of a 
hand or other object placed in a pocket to simulate a gun, is "a statement" that defendant 
is armed; it was also a "likeness, model or other reproduction" of a gun. 
The cases defendant cites from other jurisdictions in support of his argument are 
either distinguishable or unpersuasive in light of contrary Utah precedent. Indeed, one 
case cited by defendant actually supports the State's argument. In People v. Taylor, a case 
cited and discussed extensively by defendant, Taylor claimed a fatal lack of "objective" 
evidence to support his conviction for the armed robbery of a convenience store because 
he merely held a hand inside his jacket and pants while telling the cashier "This is a stick 
up" and "Open the [cash] drawer." See Aple. Br. at 18 (citing Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55, 58 
(Mich. App. 2001)). In Michigan, armed robbery is committed when the robber is "armed 
with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person 
so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon . . ." Id. at 57 (citing 
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Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In affirming that defendant committed armed robbery by 
placing his hand in his jacket and pants, the court stated: 
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the 
victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and 
our courts have long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is 
insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery. . . . Therefore, the 
prosecutor must submit "some objective evidence of the existence of a 
weapon or article" to the finder of fact. 
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against 
the defendant 
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during 
the robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant 
either had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to 
"reasonably believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the 
robbery, defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his 
pants. Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket 
and in his waistband. 
Id. at 61. 
The court also explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that a gesture 
simulating the presence of a weapon must be backed up by some kind of verbal statement. 
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with 
some specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery. 
If there is sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the 
defendant simulates a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably 
believe he is armed and, by word or conduct, threatens the victim by 
Technically, the discussion of non-verbal representations is dicta because the robber 
in the case verbally stated that he had a gun, but did not display a facsimile or a 
representation of a weapon. State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 277 (Utah App. 1995). 
Nonetheless, the language provides clear guidance in situations, such as the case at bar, in 
which the defendant represents a dangerous weapon non-verbally. 
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announcing a robbery or otherwise suggesting the potential use of the 
weapon, then the defendant may be convicted of armed robbery. 
Id 
The one case defendant cites that clearly supports his argument is Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 111 S.W.2d 710 (Ky 1986)). There, a majority of the Kentucky Supreme 
Court did conclude that a defendant could not be charged with armed robbery where he 
reached toward his back pocket and told the store clerk, "Do you want your life?" Id. 
Although this case does appear to support defendant's position, its persuasiveness is 
blunted by the fact that the holding represents a bare majority (4-3) and is followed by a 
strongly worded dissent. According to the dissenters, 
[t]he open brandishing of an object should not be dispositive of the 
degree of criminal culpability. Here the victim saw a bulge in 
Williams' pocket which he believed to be a gun. Williams stated 
that if the victim valued his life he would turn over the money and 
that if he failed to comply, he would be killed with the object hidden 
in Williams' pants. It is obvious that the bulge, coupled with 
Williams' threats, was an object intended by its user to convince the 
victim that it was a pistol or another deadly weapon, and did so 
convince him. 
Id. at 713. 
This reasoning is equally potent here. Defendant's statements and gestures were 
clearly intended to create the impression that he had a gun and was willing to use it if 
necessary. Under this Court's correct interpretation of Utah law, as well as the well-
reasoned analysis of the vast majority of jurisdictions, defendant was properly charged 
with aggravated robbery and the trial court erred in reducing the charges. 
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II. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS VICTIMS ONLY 
"SUBJECTIVELY" BELIEVED HE HAD A WEAPON IS 
MERITLESS; IN FACT, DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS 
SUPPORTED A REASONABLE, OBJECTIVE BELIEF THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESED A GUN. 
As argued in section I., above, the Utah aggravated robbery statute and relevant 
case law does not support the interpretation defendant attempts to give them. In apparent 
recognition of this, defendant also advances a policy argument expressing concern that 
allowing aggravated robbery convictions for defendants who feign possession of a gun by 
placing a hand in a pocket would allow conviction based merely on the '" caprice of a 
victim's subjective evaluation . . . ' " Aple. Br. at 18 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 
111 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986)). However valid such a concern may be, it is not implicated 
by the facts in this case. Indeed, defendant's actions objectively communicated to his 
victims that he had a weapon and would use it if his demands were met. 
As noted in the State's opening brief, at 10, the majority of jurisdictions have held 
that non-verbal conduct reasonably implying that a robber possesses a gun is sufficient to 
constitute armed robbery. See, e.g., Lynn Considine Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by 
Means of Toy or Simulated Gun or Pistol, 81 A.L.R.3d 1006. A number of courts have 
also held explicitly that a hand or bulge in a pocket or plastic bag accompanied by a 
robber's threats or demands for money is sufficient to support a conviction for armed or 
aggravated robbery. See State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Ariz. App. 1991) 
(defendants committed armed robbery by positioning hands inside pockets creating 
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appearance of deadly weapons); People v Knowles, 436 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1981) 
(unarmed robber holding hand in pocket creating impression of a gun has "displayed what 
appears to be a . . .firearm" within meaning of armed robbery statute); State v Scarlett, 
291 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1956) (reversing lower court, which upheld trial court's decision 
quash information alleging armed robbery where defendant pointed at victim with hand in 
coat pocket); State v Smallwood, 346 A.2d 164 (Del Sup. 1975) (reversing trial court's 
decision vacating conviction for armed robbery; holding that defendant had "displayed" a 
weapon within meaning of statute when he placed hand in jacket pocket and pointed at 
victim); State v. Torrence, 657 A.2d 654 (Conn. 1995) (armed robbery conviction 
affirmed where defendant "represented" possession of handgun by pointing at store 
manager with opaque plastic bag containing a tubular object and demanding money); 
People v McKinney, 245 P2d 24 (Cal. App. 1952) (defendant robbed hotel night clerk by 
stating "this is a stick-up" while holding right hand in pocket). 
In each of these cases, the defendant did more than simply walk into the store or 
other business with his hand in his pocket. Rather, all of the defendants, either through 
demands for money or threatening gestures or body language, communicated to the 
victims that they possessed weapons. These manifestations of intent, although indirect 
and non-verbal, are "objective" as that term is commonly used and as it is defined in the 
law. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1101 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "objective" as "[o]f, 
relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual's 
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perceptions, feelings, or intentions . . . [w]ithout bias or prejudice; disinterested . . .") . 
Similarly, defendant's actions with each of his victims constituted "externally 
verifiable" conduct that was reasonably understood to mean or represent that he had a 
gun. For example, when defendant confronted Lisa Ovard, manager of a gas station, on 
December 21, 2003, he had a T-shirt wrapped around his head. R. 173:10.4 Giving 
defendant the benefit of the doubt, Ms. Ovard at first thought the odd head-garb was 
merely a way to keep warm on a cold day. Id. However, when defendant placed a plastic 
bag on the counter and said "Put the money in the bag," Ms. Ovard noticed defendant had 
his hand in the front right pocket of his coat and that something inside the pocket— 
"either a gun or a fmger"—was pointing at her. R. 173:11, 14. Based on the objective, 
"externally verifiable" actions and statements by defendant, Ms. Ovard reasonably 
concluded defendant had a weapon and would use it if she did not comply with his 
demands. Id. 
Cynthia West, an employee at another gas station convenience store, testified that 
defendant approached her on December 22, 2003, with a scarf wrapped around his head 
"to where I could only see his eyes." R. 173:18.5 Defendant handed her a plastic bag and 
said something, but she could not understand him and wondered if he wanted her to 
dispose of the bag. Id. She asked defendant to repeat what he had said and he replied: 
4
 Count I, case no. 041900176. 
5
 Count II, case no. 041900176. 
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"Fill it." Id. She also noticed that defendant had his hand in his pocket "and it looked 
like he had a gun in his hand. And I wasn't going to argue with him, so I opened up the 
till and gave him all the cash." Id. She later told police that something "poked out" from 
defendant's pocket and that it could have been "his finger or a Tootsie Roll or a gun." R. 
173:19. Ms. West reasonably assumed that it was a gun. 
Jennifer Forsgren experienced similar "externally verifiable" representations from 
defendant when he robbed the convenience store where she works on December 23, 2003. 
R. 173:28.6 Defendant entered the store with a scarf wrapped around his head concealing 
all but his eyes. Id. Like the other victims, she thought nothing of it at first because of 
the winter weather. Id. But when defendant approached her with his right hand in his 
coat pocket and stated, "Put the money in the bag," she realized his true intent. R. 
173:29, 31. "I assumed he had a gun," she said. Id. Ms. Forsgren, like the other victims, 
behaved reasonably in the face of unmistakable "externally verifiable" representations. 
The same must be said of Allan Cantonwine, also a gas station clerk. Arriving at 
work on December 24, 2003, Mr. Cantonwine was called over to the cash register by 
another clerk, Myeong-Ock Kim. R. 173:35.7 She asked him how to open the cash 
register. Id. It was then that Mr. Cantonwine noticed defendant as he stepped out from 
behind the counter. R. 173:36. Defendant had a white scarf covering his face and 
6
 Count III, case no. 041900176. 
7
 Count IV, case no. 041900176. 
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pointed at Mr. Cantonwine with an object concealed in his coat pocket. R. 173:37. Mr. 
Cantonwine testified that he also felt something poke into his back when defendant was 
behind him. R. 173:43-44. "It could have been a candy bar, a finger, a gun. . . . If it was 
a gun, I didn't want him to shoot me. If it was a finger, I didn't care. I was just going to 
do what I was told." R. 173:37-38. 
Julie Valdez, the manager of an appliance store, had a similar experience with 
defendant on January 6, 2004. Wearing a hooded sweatshirt and a knit cap, defendant 
Q 
approached and said, "Give me your money." R. 173:61. At the same time, defendant 
"protruded [sic] whatever he had in his pocket, like he had somethin' in his pocket— 
whether it was a gun or not, I don't know," R. 173:63. She told him she had no money, 
R. 173:62. She and defendant briefly argued, then he left. Id. Ms. Valdez testified that 
she was not sure whether he had a gun "because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 
173:66. Nonetheless, she said it would be "stupid" to assume it was not a gun. R. 
173:65. 
Defendant was also wearing a hooded sweatshirt and knit cap when he confronted 
Esther Cho, a clerk at a market. "[H]e did have his hand in his pocket and pointed toward 
me as if it was something. And he did ask for money." R. 173:70.9 She gave him $20 
and he left. Of the coat-pocket pointing gesture, she said: "I didn't know exactly what it 
8
 Count I, case no. 041900182. 
9
 Count II, case no. 041900182. 
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was but it scared me." R. 173:71. She said she felt threatened. "If he didn't threaten me, 
I would not give him $20. However, his hand was in his pocket and something was in 
there and I was scared." R. 173:73. 
Even though defendant said nothing about a weapon, the meaning of his conduct 
and other statements made his meaning crystal clear: "I have a gun and I will shoot you if 
don't do what I say." Under Utah law, and the law of most other states, defendant's 
actions constituted a "representation" of a "dangerous weapon" and an expression of the 
intent to use it. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). Under these circumstances, the 
trial court erred in reducing the charges because defendant did not verbally state that he 
had a weapon. This Court should reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to 
reduce the charges of aggravated robbery against defendant. 
DATED: February 22, 2005 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BRETT J. DEiPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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